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The international community’s narrative of the Malian conflict (2012-2015) is overly simplistic. 
The United Nations, France, and the US focused solely on the terrorist aggression facing Mali 
and other West African states after the fallout of the Arab Spring—to the detriment of the Mali-
an people’s needs and long-term stability. This paper presents Malian, West African, and Afri-
can perspectives in contrast to the Westernized narrative, in order to critically analyze the 2013 
French intervention in Mali and the under-studied effects of colonial history in contemporary 
action in the Sahara-Sahel region. The paper juxtaposes the proclaimed “success” of the French 
counterterrorism intervention against the historical injustices of colonialism and the continuing 
effects of neocolonialism on development and inequality within and among states. This paper 
cautions against allowing states, such as France, to exert unrestrained military power for coun-
terterrorist aims without considering the legality and necessity of such action in the context of 
each state. In the specific case of Mali, the French intervention prevented the resolution of the 
Kel Tamasheq rebellion against the Malian government and precluded regional powers from 
taking on the role of primary intervening authority, which continues to affect the resolution of 
violence and the integrity of the state.
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Introduction
 The 2012-2015 Malian conflict encapsulates the shortsightedness with which states and 
international institutions respond to internal disputes with widespread humanitarian, political, 
and security implications. Mali and the greater Sahara-Sahel region still face extremist threats 
and instability resulting from this conflict and connected volatile situations. Evaluating the 
factors that provoked the initial outbreak of conflict with those factors perpetuating instability 
throughout the Sahel in 2019 can inform potential solutions to this and similar conflicts. In 
this particular context, one of the central factors of the conflict is the historical background 
of the Malian state, which was a French colony from 1892 to 1946. French colonial rule had 
created a system that formally excluded people living in the northern regions compared to the 
southern regions that ultimately precipitated the 2012 conflict. Despite the clear connection 
between French colonial rule and the French intervention, analyses of the conflict and resulting 
intervention do not accurately portray the primacy of the historical ethno-political division 
in leading the northern Kel Tamasheq people to rebel against the Malian government in 2012. 
Western, and specifically European and American, responses to violence in Mali ignored the 
complexity of the national situation, choosing instead to focus on the terrorist groups that 
capitalized on the rebellion to infiltrate Mali’s northern region and establish operational bases. 
This essay thus presents the historical and political context of the Malian conflict and analyzes 
regional and legal debates of France’s third-party intervention. 
 It is necessary here to acknowledge that my own experiences and educational 
trajectory has been within a primarily Western-oriented context. Where this essay attempts to 
differentiate between Westernized narratives of sovereignty, violence, and peacebuilding, I, as 
the author, have been limited to solely researching local African perspectives.
 Overall, this essay discusses France’s influence in Mali and in West Africa in the twenty-
first century with a specific emphasis on Mali’s colonial history and France’s current interests 
in West Africa. The primary contribution that this discussion makes is to build a connection 
between modern norms of counterterrorist operations and neocolonialist actions of exerting 
political, economic, or military influence over an independent state. This connection can 
potentially inform future analyses and critiques of third-party military interventions, as well 
as influence changes to the international security framework. This essay concludes that the 
French government, when executing the 2013 military intervention in Mali, not only violated 
Mali’s sovereignty on the grounds of counterterrorism, but superseded regional authority 
over the conflict’s resolution in order to expand French military influence in the Sahara-Sahel 
region.
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The 2012 Malian Conflict
 The conflict began on January 17th, 2012, when a northern separatist group called the 
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebelled against the government, 
located in the southern city of Bamako (Thurston, 2013). The government, headed by President 
Amadou Toumani Touré, quickly lost territorial control and authority to this rebellion, which 
was comprised primarily of ethnic Kel Tamasheq (sometimes referred to as “Tuareg”) people 
(Bergamaschi & Diawara, 2014). This ethnic group and its insurgents claimed independence 
from southern Mali on the basis of historical disunity and institutional inequality between the 
Sahara (north) and Sahel (south) regions of the state (Heisbourg, 2013).
 The map in Figure 1 shows the territory of Azawad that the MNLA wanted to become 
independent, as well as important cities that played a role in the conflict, such as Gao, 
Timbuktu, Mopti, and Bamako (Heisbourg, 2013).
 Presidential elections were scheduled for April 2012 with the purpose of replacing 
Touré. Before this could occur, Captain Ahmadou Sanogo of the Malian military, frustrated 
with the government’s inability to prevent the northern rebellion,  successfully led a coup 
d’état against the Bamako government on March 21, 2012 (Heisbourg, 2013). Soon after the 
coup, the Algerian government led conflict resolution talks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 
and installed a transitional government with the head of Mali’s national assembly, Dioncounda 
Traoré, as temporary president (Stigall, 2015). 
 In April 2012, the MNLA moved south and conquered the major cities of Gao, Kidal, 
and Timbuktu in its pursuit to gain complete control of the northern half of Mali (Stigall, 
2015). The MNLA claimed independence of Azawad on April 6, 2012 (A Touraeg State at our 
Borders, 2012). In the following weeks, Islamic extremist groups, including Ansar al-Dine, the 
Movement for Uniqueness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), took primary control of the north from the MNLA while both integrating 
and fighting amongst each other (Marchal, 2013). The Algerian government continued to 
facilitate peace in Mali, together with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) led by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré (“Member States,” 2012). In 
July 2012, ECOWAS asked the United Nations to permit a regional intervention in Mali and 
secure peace, but the UN’s forces were prevented from intervening until September 2013 when 
the situation had drastically deteriorated (“Member States,” 2012). Further clashes occurring 
closer to Bamako in January 2013 provoked an international response to release the capital’s 
one million inhabitants from Islamic extremists control (Chivvis, 2016). As a result, France led 
a rapid-response military intervention on January 11, 2013 (Bannelier & Cristakis, 2013). This 
intervention consisted of approximately 4,500 French troops under the name Operation Serval 
(Bannelier, 2013; Charbonneau & Sears, 2014). The operation’s military aims were “to secure 
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Bamako, stop the terrorist offensive, strike the enemy’s rear bases and prepare for the arrival 
of African forces” (Heisbourg, 2013, p. 11). ECOWAS forces arrived eight days after the French 
intervention and helped liberate the northern towns that were under extremist control on 
January 20, 2013 (Heisbourg, 2013).
 Under ECOWAS, Algerian, and Mauritanian leadership, the preparations for 
democratic elections began immediately after control was established in the north. Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keïta was elected the new President of Mali in August 2013, and the country began 
implementing conflict resolution actions with invested regional governments and non-
terrorist internal actors (Bøås, 2013). The French maintained a military presence after the new 
government was in place; then they transitioned into a regional counterterrorism operation on 
July 13, 2014 called Operation Barkhane (Bannelier & Cristakis, 2013). Amidst this transition, 
a reconciliation process occurred between the Bamako government and the northern groups 
that remained separate from the violent extremist groups. On May 15, 2015, the Coordination 
of Azawad Movements, the Platform of Armed Groups, and the Malian government signed 
a peace accord, officially ending the internal conflict and providing guidelines for democratic 
elections of local representatives throughout the entire state (Nyirabikali, 2015).
Overview of Existing Literature and Importance of this 
Paper
 The bulk of the literature regarding foreign involvement in Mali takes a Western 
perspective of the Malian conflict and the French intervention. This “Westernized” approach 
takes for granted theories about state formation, sovereignty, and institutional capacity from 
the Westphalian tradition, wherein states have a monopoly on the use of force. Due to a lack of 
contextual understanding, no Western-oriented scholar comprehensively presents the Malian 
conflict along its various axes: national-international, international-regional, ethnic-political, 
local insurgents-Islamic extremists, northern Mali-southern Mali, colonialism-neocolonialism, 
and terrorism-counterterrorism. Therefore, an analysis of the decolonization process from a 
non-Western, African-centered perspective enables greater understanding of the disconnect 
between the international community’s and West African interpretations of internal conflict 
dynamics and the 2013 French intervention. 
 The Western-oriented literature mentions the conflict’s complexity, but does not 
distinguish between the conflict’s internal aspects and the regional forces driving the 
terrorist groups into Mali. Some Malian scholars question the French military’s intentions 
as a neocolonialist intervention with inevitable, long-term repercussions, as a result of 
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this oversight. Neocolonialism, defined for the purposes of this essay as political coercion 
and indefinite military occupation of a sovereign state, informs African scholars’ views of 
French involvement in the Sahara-Sahel. Africa’s intellectual tradition incorporates historical 
experiences of colonization and contemporary understanding of neocolonial economic, 
political, and social policies that protect international actors’ interests. Neocolonial policies 
can be implemented in areas that were never formally colonized, but neocolonialism is 
still foundationally connected to the process of decolonization. Decolonization includes 
recognizing oppressive policies and seeking to establish independently-controlled political, 
economic and social systems. This essay presents the regional analysis of the French 
intervention in contradiction to the Western-dominated narrative of the positive merits of 
third-party interventions against terrorist threats. In the interest of validating the African 
governmental sovereignty and authority, this essay demonstrates the negative implications of 
prioritizing counterterrorism norms over resolving internal conflicts within the international 
security structure. 
Historical and Political Context
French Colonial Rule and Decolonization 
 In 1892, France took control of the territory that includes present-day Mali and parts 
of Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and administered the region as French 
Soudan (Ghosh, 2013). The colonial government administered French Soudan from the 
more environmentally-hospitable Sahel area, while the northern Sahara area remained 
semi-undefined, collectively administered with three other European powers, and ruled by 
local groups (Sèbe, 2013). The nomadic Kel Tamasheq revolted against all French efforts to 
consolidate Kel Tamasheq, Songhai, Fulani, and Bambara people into a confined territory 
(Lecocq, 2014). In exchange for political support, the French allowed the northern Kel 
Tamasheq to enslave Black and Arab southern groups that they considered racially and 
ethnically inferior (Harmon, 2014). The Kel Tamasheq still rebelled against the colonial state in 
1916 and 1962, securing the ire and distrust of the French government (Harmon, 2014). 
The independence movement between 1946 and 1968 resulted in the French Soudan’s 
northern groups coming under the control of the post-colonial democratic Malian government 
(Harmon, 2014; Sèbe, 2013). Modibo Keïta, the first president of Mali, thus blamed the 1963 
Kel Tamasheq rebellion on the French because the French had politically supported the Kel 
Tamasheq’s feelings of superiority and potential for autonomy during the colonial period 
(Harmon, 2014). French sympathies toward the northern nomadic populations, along with 
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“uncontrolled socio-economic and cultural disruptions, stemming from inadequate political 
systems,” remained a legacy of the colonial period (Harmon, 2014, p. 214). Many Malians refer 
to this legacy when explaining the continued tensions between northern and southern groups 
in the present (Sèbe, 2013). 
 During the Algerian independence movement towards the end of the colonial 
period, France’s indiscriminate violence and torture campaigns led sympathetic African 
leaders, including those in Mali, to unite against French attempts to maintain colonial-era 
hierarchies and underdevelopment, thereby creating the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) (Maiangwa, 2013). After gaining independence, Mali, Algeria, 
and other Francophone countries used both violence and regional economic collaboration to 
expel French influence and power from North and West Africa. Despite calls for democracy 
and economic liberalism in the immediate post-colonial period, Bruno Charbonneau claims 
that the participation of African soldiers in the French colonial military had distorted the line 
between “colonizer” and “colonized,” ultimately making violence acceptable in colonial spaces 
(2013). This violence—contextually defined as both an act that destroys and “a pedagogical 
tool that works to control narratives of space and identity and as a politically enabling device 
that affects agency”—favored continued French military presence in North and West Africa 
(Charbonneau, 2013, p. 111 & 85). African leaders had few resources to consolidate and secure 
their newly defined territories against internal and external threats to sovereign unity other 
than collaborating with the French military, thereby affirming the permanent influence of the 
French military in independently sovereign states (Charbonneau, 2013). The Republic of Mali’s 
admission to the United Nations on September 22, 1960 and inclusion into Western narratives 
of state sovereignty ultimately reinforced France’s military bases—or “collaboration”—among 
fellow UN member states in Africa (Joly, 2013). 
 A similar situation occurred in Chad in the 1980s. Upon the Libyan occupation of 
Chad, France launched Operation Épervier (“Sparrow Hawk”) and brought 1,200 troops to 
N’Djamena, the capital of Chad (Stapleton, 2013). Even after the Organization of African Unity 
helped establish a ceasefire, the French stayed in Chad and prevented a transfer of power 
from Hissène Habré to Idriss Déby (Stapleton, 2013). They ultimately allowed Déby to take 
power, but many internal and external actors accused the French government of dismissing the 
needs of Chadians so that an authoritarian leader could maintain power for France’s benefit 
(Maclean, 2018). By supporting this leader, French troops were able to remain in Chad and 
maintain a military base at N’Djamena. 
Postcolonialism in the Twenty-first Century: Security Policy and 
Counterterrorism
Tony Chafer describes French postcolonial policy: “French governments under the Fifth 
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Republic adopted a multi-layered approach to maintaining the special relationship with 
Africa, combining an array of ‘official’ policy instruments with a complex range of unofficial, 
family-like, and often covert ties” (2018, para. 48). France’s system of official and unofficial 
postcolonial relations with former colonies facilitated the expansion of foreign military 
operations in the global counterterrorism movement of the early 2000s, starting with 
intelligence operations against Mokhtar Belmokhtar and other individuals connected to Al-
Qaeda in 2002 (Hammer, 2018). In the contemporary context, France justifies its pre-positioned 
troops and military capacity to intervene under the United Nations’ notions of necessarily 
providing support to states deemed incapable of maintaining sovereignty and control.
Critics and scholars conceive of French military involvement as part of the broader 
contemporary era, in which international institutions such as the United Nations can revoke 
states’ sovereignty when deemed necessary. One scholar asserts that after 9/11 and the United 
States’ push for a global “war on terror,” a redefinition of sovereignty emerged, whereby states 
have to adhere to certain counterterrorism obligations in order to remain sovereign states 
(Ramos, 2013). The argument for sovereignty as the definitive aspect of a state’s freedom to act 
within its own boundaries is an inherently Western construction of state capacity and violence. 
Debates in International Law on Military Interventions
 Challenging Western notions of sovereignty in a non-Western context underlies 
debates on France’s motivations and legal grounding for intervening in the Malian conflict. 
It is important to note that even when accepting the validity of international intervention to 
combat global terrorist threats, international law does not support the French intervention. 
The two international legal principles that are typically cited in justification of the French 
intervention in Mali are first, the Malian government formally inviting France to intervene, 
and second, the UN Security Council passing a resolution allowing multilateral forces to 
intervene in the conflict (Bannelier, 2013). Karine Bannelier and Theodore Christakis (2013) 
take these legal principles in tandem to support the legal intervention of France in the Mali 
conflict, also claiming that either of these two principles provide sufficient justification when 
applied individually. In contrast, Dan Stigall (2015) suggests that the French government relied 
on contestable principles of international law that governed third party military intervention. 
Stigall’s argument stems from different interpretations of “intervention by invitation” and the 
United Nations Security Council’s “implied authorization,” which he says are “less defined” in 
international law, especially in the use of military force (2015, p. 223).
 First, the Malian government’s invitation cannot stand as sufficient grounds for the 
French intervention. International law explicitly states that external intervention by invitation 
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is unlawful when “the objective of this intervention is to settle an exclusively internal political 
strife in favour of the established government which launched the invitation” (Bannelier, 2013, 
p. 870). Before the French intervened, their support of the Malian government in Bamako was 
explicit within UN Security Council Resolutions 2012 and 2085, which laid out support for 
“the Armed and Security Forces of Mali” under the “authority of the State of Mali” (Stigall, 
2015, p. 51). Debates on the French intervention generally conclude that the democratic 
elections that France encouraged in 2013 were not fully legitimate, because rebelling groups 
and displaced persons were excluded from voting (Blyth et al., 2013). It is also important 
to note that ECOWAS leaders agreed to prevent the Interim President Dioncounda Traoré, 
the Prime Minister, and other members of the transitional government from contesting the 
2013 presidential election; this undermined Dioncounda Traoré’s legitimacy as president. 
The Malian government’s questionable legitimacy in 2012 and 2013, due to the coup d’état 
and the lack of free, fair, and transparent democratic elections supports the conclusion that 
the invitation to intervene was meant to import legitimacy to the state government over all 
internal actors—extremist or rebellious. Thus, while international law may allow third parties 
to intervene in internal conflicts at the request of the legitimate government, the limit to 
Traore’s presidency imposed by ECOWAS and other West African leaders negates the French 
government’s justification for deploying troops to Mali in January 2013.
The French Intervention as Neocolonialist
 Soon after French troops were deployed to Mali in January 2013, then-president 
François Hollande (2013) noted in a television broadcast that the French military intervened in 
Mali in order to support the Malian army against the terrorist aggression that was threatening 
“all of West Africa.” Hollande references the movements of AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar al-Dine 
throughout the Sahara-Sahel, but makes no mention of the non-extremist insurgent groups 
such as the MNLA. Thus, he ignores Mali’s internal rebellion and assumes that all extremist 
groups had universal objectives within Mali and the broader region. His statement more 
closely represents France’s colonial experience in attempting to quell any group opposing 
state authority than an accurate understanding of group dynamics within Mali in 2012. The 
French government and international communities held incorrect beliefs, primarily that since 
2012 all armed groups existing in Mali are Islamic extremist groups with broad strategic 
interests in the region and the world. Furthermore, French security policy in Mali mirrors prior 
French military engagement in Algeria and in Chad. In both instances, references to African 
“tribes” or religious affiliations of participating groups “convey already formed explanations 
to understanding the conflict thus an implicit programme of action that a priori authorizes 
105
violence”(Charbonneau, 2014, p. 118). The focus on combatting ideological extremism was 
easily extrapolated to target all armed groups within Mali.
 The Kel Tamasheq and the MNLA were conceived as part of the “terrorist threat” in 
Mali due to the persistent French colonial stereotype that the Kel Tamasheq are “a war prone, 
nomad, and anarchist population” (Lecocq, 2014, p. 90). Though research on the Malian 
conflict specifies that the rebel groups do not all represent radical Islam or violent extremist 
groups, or the objectives of violent extremist groups seeking to impose Sharia law, this belief 
remained part of the French narrative (Marc, Verjee, & Mogaka, 2015). Religious extremism 
in West Africa had been rising throughout prior decades, and it did not specifically or 
intentionally cause the Mali conflict (Harmon, 2014). In fact, the extremists’ strict interpretation 
of Islam is at odds with local tradition in the Sahara-Sahel, and there was no documented 
proof that the armed groups in Mali were homogeneous just because they were “homegrown” 
(Sèbe, 2013; Marc, 2015) .When the French intervened in 2013, the armed groups were still 
undergoing internal changes, including splintering into different factions and joining with 
other local groups, and the internal conflict was unresolved (Stigall, 2015). 
 The international community condoned the French intervention on behalf of the 
Malian government through the counterterrorist narrative, which unjustifiably homogenized 
the armed groups actively engaged in Mali. Joshua Hammer (2018) notes that some Malians 
attacked the overall French intervention as neocolonialist, “and lashed out at former president 
Nicolas Sarkozy for his central role in the NATO attacks that had unseated Qaddafi [in Libya] 
and destabilized the region” (p. 197). Malian author Aminata Dramane Traoré (2013) wrote 
of the French insistence on military intervention: “Paris has just sent to the Security Council a 
resolution in support, he claims, at the request of the interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, 
for a military intervention in the North […] the planned deployment will be African only in 
name, since it was designed to serve the interests of France in the Sahel” (p. 92-93) . This and 
other Malian perspectives of the conflict recognize France’s historical and current imposition 
into Mali’s national affairs, as well as Western powers’ culpability in sparking the “terrorist 
aggression facing all of West Africa”. These perspectives were overlooked at the moment of 
intervention.
 After intervening, the French transitioned Operation Serval into the broad 
counterterrorism effort Operation Barkhane, thereby reinforcing Malians’ criticism regarding 
France’s neocolonial, long-term interests. Heisbourg believes that when the French were 
calculating the cost-benefit of intervening, Mali was most likely seen as a “convenient location 
for positioning forces in the relatively low-cost ‘light footprint’ mode which has served France 
so well” in protecting its economic, financial, and political interests and investments in West 
and North Africa (2013, p. 10). Traoré wrote again to her friend Boubacar Boris Diop two days 
after French troops landed in Mali, stating: “They have simply stolen our country from us, 
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Boris. I am Malian and I say forcefully and loudly that they have stolen Mali, under the pretext 
of protecting it from jihadists”(2013, p. 127). Like Traoré, many Malians were aware of the need 
for security during the 2012 conflict and the subsequent power struggle over northern Mali, 
but they neither wanted nor accepted prolonged French occupation (Traoré and Diop, 2013).
Regional Responses to the 2012 Conflict
 Powerful actors in North and West Africa, the African Union, ECOWAS, and regional 
hegemons like Algeria and Nigeria had active interests in Mali. ECOWAS (along with 
support from non-ECOWAS members Algeria, Chad, and Mauritania) was prepared to 
deploy approximately 3,300 troops to support a multilateral United Nations stabilization 
and peacekeeping force in October 2012 (Fomunyoh, 2013). Though Algeria, Mauritania, 
Chad, Libya, Morocco, and the fifteen ECOWAS members had collaborated on a resolution 
outlining such objectives at an October 2012 conference, the UN Security Council claimed that 
information about a regional military force’s objectives and means was lacking. Consequently, 
the UNSC refused to authorize an ECOWAS or African Union-led peacekeeping or operational 
force (United Nations Official Document: Resolution 2056, 2012). UN Resolution 2085 came 
close to authorizing force in Mali in December 2012, calling on all member states to “provide 
coordinated assistance” to Malian forces in the fight to maintain the territorial integrity of 
the state and to hamper the threats posed by terrorist organizations (Stigall, 2015). Though, 
this resolution only uses the phrase “all necessary means” in reference to the African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) as a potential military force (Stigall, 2015). 
This phrase is typically accepted as the legal and principled justification for third-party 
military interventions, but the French military never received such clearance.
 Algeria and Tunisia openly rejected the 2013 French deployment because both 
governments feared protracted French involvement in the region, and they also had concerns 
that a French-led intervention would inspire retaliation against Western powers or Western-
affiliated North African governments (Ammour, 2013). France’s push for hasty elections in 
2013, as discussed earlier, also demonstrates its political neocolonialist agenda; the French 
government benefited from a Malian state with the semblance of a democratic government 
that agreed to ongoing French military presence. Senegalese author Boubacar Boris Diop 
summed up the French intervention, writing in June 2013, “of all the European powers, France 
is the only one to have never been able to resign itself to decolonize and Operation Serval will 
evidently comfort it in its reactionary stubbornness” (p. 132).
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Aftermath and Ramifications
 Hollande and the French government mitigated international concerns outside of 
Africa over any neocolonialist intentions by establishing counterterrorism as the primary 
motivation for intervening in Mali. Operation Barkhane was viewed as a reorganization of 
France’s prepositioned troops in Africa, and it addressed the expanded territory in which 
terrorist groups operated (Hicks, 2017). Although 1,000 French troops were planning to remain 
in Mali under Operation Barkhane, Hollande only met with the governments of Cote d’Ivoire, 
Niger, and Chad to discuss plans for Operation Barkhane’s expansion (Fini Serval, Voici 
Barkhane, 2016). The French government continued to dictate plans to the Malian government 
without taking into account the Malian citizens’ open belief that “the question of the North is, 
obviously, the most urgent to resolve. Detonator of the crisis, it remains the main threat to its 
settlement” (Le Mali Après Serval : éviter La Rechute, 2014). By ignoring the internal conflict, 
the French intervention gave power to the Malian government and shut down dialogue with 
armed groups in the north and real peace talks with all representatives of northern Mali (Le 
Mali Après Serval : éviter La Rechute, 2014). The argument for counterterrorism consumed the 
French and Malian governments and prevented any legitimate contest of state authority.
Policy Recommendations
 The French and Malian governments’ simplified analysis of the terrorist groups’ threats 
to Mali’s boundaries excluded numerous voices from the national decision-making structure. 
The current Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta must increase the representation of all 
political, ethnic, economic, religious, and social groups within the government—as long as the 
state maintains control over security solutions. The question of northern Mali and its major 
ethnic groups’ claims to autonomy, including the Kel Tamasheq, the Songhai, Arabs, and the 
Fulani, necessitates a reconsideration of Mali’s national identity to accommodate the rights of 
all ethnic, religious, political, and social groups.
 As Mali reconfigures its internal affairs in relation to various groups, international, 
regional, and national actors must revisit the details of the 2012 conflict, the northern 
rebellion, and Mali’s capabilities in addressing remaining terrorist groups. Jonathan Sears 
recommends that any assistance given to Mali, including political, economic, developmental, 
or military, also “appreciates Mali’s dynamic and sometimes contentious indigenous social 
regulation mechanisms” (Sears, 2013, p. 444). The French government must also acknowledge 
its turbulent history in West Africa and the illegality of the Malian intervention, in order to 
transition from military assistance to other forms of aid, because its military does not have the 
full consent of each represented group in Mali to remain. Following the rationale for removing 
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the French military from Mali, any future French monetary or political assistance to the state 
“should not assume that the authority of the Malian nation-state is uncontested, particularly in 
light of Mali’s regional, urban, rural, and identity-based cleavages” (Sears, 2013, p. 445). France 
can still assert its national interests by combatting terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel through 
recognized “soft” counterterrorism methods, such as programs that attempt to de-radicalize 
individuals and promote economic stability (Khalfan, 2016). France’s colonial history must 
always factor into contemporary action in North and West Africa.
 The Malian case demonstrates the need for more effective collaboration among 
regional authorities when crises occur. In order to build on the recommendation for increased 
representation, North and West African authorities and the African Union should expand 
their current institutions to include representatives who can attest to various groups’ needs 
and claims. Nevertheless, in order for these institutions to act efficiently and effectively, 
the international community and the United Nations must accord these bodies with legal 
mandates to use “all means necessary” when agreed upon by the states in question, the 
African Union, and the representative bodies. Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger already 
have political mechanisms with regular consultations at the ministerial level, intelligence 
mechanisms, and military mechanisms (Okereke, 2016). These countries are also in the process 
of implementing a regional security strategy, developed at the 2011 high-level conference on 
Security, Development and Partnership, but they will need external support and recognition 
to act without oversight or intrusion from international actors (Okereke, 2016). Thus, the 
efforts made to address regional security and development concerns should be prioritized 
and supported by external partners. Regional bodies at the national and local level will 
be most effective at adequately representing the needs of West African peoples and states, 
and the international community must forgo any further stereotyping of these nations as 
underdeveloped or without recourse to address regional, national, and local issues just to 
justify military, political, and economic intervention.
Conclusion
 As this essay has demonstrated, the Malian conflict includes more complex 
dynamics than terrorist threats and general instability. The French government’s continued 
simplification of the security concerns in West Africa has ramifications for counterterrorism 
operations and third-party military interventions in sovereign states. In taking control of 
the stabilization process in Mali, the French government hinders national and regional West 
African abilities to institute long-term order throughout the Sahara-Sahel. With continued 
French presence in West Africa, the greatest threat facing West African states is local, national, 
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and regional backlash to French neocolonialism and militarization of the region. The policy 
recommendations above are beginning steps for Mali, France, and African authorities to 
replace the pattern of neocolonialism with accountability, equal representation, and resilience.
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